Talk:Mark W. Clark

Untitled

Actually the book I got the quote from was Hometown Heros: Dubuque Remembers WW II. I got it mixed up with a similar book the Dubuque Telegraph Herald published that had Our Country Called in its title that delt with Korean and Vietnam Veterans.

I removed this quote, as the personal opinions of a single person who served under Clark, while colorful, are not terribly relevant and are inappropriate for an encyclopedia article. They might be re-inserted if given some context and support with additional material about the attitudes of the men who Clark commanded, but as presented they stuck out like a sore thumb. unfutz 03:10, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

This sentence could be construed as quite disparaging and really needs a citation if it is going to stay in: "Mark Clark's quick rise from field officer through general officer ranks has been attributed[citation needed] to his relationship with Generals George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower." —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.63.88.111 (talk) 16:48, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

I agree, even with the citation it could be misleading. I am no fan of Clark's but surely the article needs to recognize that promotions were quite rare in the inter-war period, when the Army was tiny. When growth happened, it was fast, and everyone got promoted rapidly. Eisenhower was a LTC in 1939 if I'm not mistaken.

DMorpheus (talk) 20:37, 20 January 2009 (UTC)

WikiProject Military history/Assessment/Tag & Assess 2008

Article reassessed and graded as start class. --dashiellx (talk) 11:14, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

Clark, a notable hero

I think that Clark is recognized as being one of the greatest generals, if not the greatest of WW2. He was reponsible for the defeat of Italy, one of the three major powers. This should be researched further. Wallie (talk) 15:25, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

By all accounts, Clark was a decidely average commander, especially for his foul-ups around Rome (and possibly Anzio, I'll have to research further). Calling him one of the greatest generals is taking it rather far, I think. Skinny87 (talk) 16:03, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

Nope, meant Salerno; I always get them confused. Skinny87 (talk) 16:05, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

I agree with Skinny87, besides criticism of Salerno and Anzio, some historical analysis I've seen is very critical of his (headline grabbing) taking of Rome instead of moving his army to further pummel the retreating Germans which allowed them time to regroup and continue the fight north of Rome. Hardnfast (talk) 01:22, 1 April 2009 (UTC)

I also agree with Skinny87: I'm not a historian, but I have read the war diaries of both Spike Milligan and Alan Whicker, both of whom saw action in Italy. Both men firmly believed that Clark's action in taking Rome was specifically against orders, and far from defeating the Axis in Italy, his choices lengthened the war in that theatre and cost many Allied lives. Shinydan —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.150.143.251 (talk) 21:38, 5 August 2009 (UTC)

By all accounts, it seems to be biased one way or the other on whether they are British or American. The bottom line was that the British were annoyed, as Clark had the brains to go in and quickly seize Rome, catching the Germans napping. The British were wanting a triumphal entry into Rome themselves, but Clark and the Americans trumped them. The Pope and Catholic adherents were always grateful to Clark and the GIs, as they saved Rome and the Church. Wallie (talk) 02:59, 22 October 2009 (UTC)

Wallie, even Mark's biographer doesn't make such a biased claim. The dash for Rome was one of Clark's greatest mistakes; while he paraded through Rome in triumph, he let a large number of German troops go free from an encircling movement that could have captured or destroyed the majority of them, and made the Allied advance much more difficult. Add to that the poor decisions made at Salerno and during the general Italian advance, as well as a toxic personality that made even Alexander frustrated at times, and you get a decidedly average commander. And before you say anything about supposed British bias, please note that I've been similarly critical of most, if not all, of the 'big' Allied commanders who served during the conflict. There are only a few who I can think deserving of praise; mostly Ridgway and Gavin, O'Connor is a good one, as is Slim. Skinny87 (talk) 07:27, 22 October 2009 (UTC)

Greatest General of WW2??? How? He took Rome, but Italy overthrew Mussolini and sought peace with the allies when Sicily fell. Clark was not a prime mover in that! The bulk of the fighting in the Italian campaign was against the Germans, and it became a War of Liberation, as the Germans ultimately treated Italy as an occupied country. By taking Rome, far from achieving a decisive victory in the campaign, Clark had to face Kesselring at the Gothic line to the north, and the War in Italy was still raging when Germany surrendered. So Clark didn't force Italy to make peace, or win a great victory to drive the Germans out of Italy. So how does this make him a better General than say Patton, or Montgomery, or Bradley, or Zhukov? And I'm not considering the Pacific War here, or lower ranked Generals like Gavin or Taylor. The comment about the British wanting to have the entry into Rome for themselves is how Clark saw things. He wanted the Honor of being the "conqueror of Rome" and believed the orders from Alexander were to "cheat him" of the glory. But in pursuit of publicity, he gave up the chance of destroying the German Army in Italy. If he'd done that he may have been able to stake such a claim. Instead he went for publicity, and got it for a whole 2 days until D-Day put the Italian campaign off the front pages. If you don't want to back a "big name" like Patton or Montgomery as the best Allied General in the West, a better choice would be Patton's Corps commander Collins who was more responsible than anyone for the victory in the battle of Falaise, which smashed the German Army in Normandy. Much more significant militarily than Clark's triumphant entry into Rome, even if it wasn't the quite the same photo op.

I'm going to document the following after going through my library: 1) Clark's conduct during the Salerno campaign was widely criticized for being haphazard and timid. 2) The landing at Anzio was a near-complete disaster because the troops were not allowed to proceed and had nowhere to retreat to out of reach of the German big guns. 3) The bombardment of Monte Cassino was predicted to be a disaster because a ruins is easier to defend than a building intact, and the direct assault up the hill by various mountain units resulted in some losses greater than 90%.

As to his promotion up the ranks, this has always been something of a mystery, according to everything I have read. Let me see what I can find out about that.Uniquerman (talk) 20:08, 9 June 2011 (UTC)

I have not been readily able to get at my source material that is in storage. I'll start with Liddell Hart's History of the Secone World War, Paragon Books, First American Edition 1971, First Printing 1979, G.P. Putnam, New York NY. Liddell Hart says little that would indicate Clark's brilliance and much more on his caution and excess interest in secrecy. 1) During negotiations with the French General Mast, Clark withheld information and exaggerated the size of a landing force in Algeria, which Hart characterizes as "lacking in frankness" and having an "excess of secrecy...[that]...was unwise" given the Allied forces need for Mast's cooperation. 2) As to Salerno, he noted Clark's refusal to authorize preliminary bombardment owing to his demand for secrecy for an operation that was hardly a secret to the Germans. As a result, he prepared to evacuate shortly thereafter because of the stiff German resistance that was prepared for the landing and unimpeded by an preliminary softening up by air and artillery attacks. Following the impoundment of Salerno, advance northward was extremely cautious, on the order of three miles a day, leading to a high percentage of casualties. 3)Most of the vacillating and ineffective action at and after the Anzio landing can be laid at the feet of John P. Lucas, although Clark was his superior and allowed it. 4) Clark had little to with Monte Cassino. There it was Lucas again, and the exhausted and demoralized American troops quit the field on 11 February. 5) As other commentators have noted, the other operation that puts Clark's competence in question was drive on Rome, allowing Kesselring's 10th Army to escape through the Appenines.

It must be said that Liddell Hart finds the whole Italian campaign ill-conceived and all its commanders suspect, because of the Allied dictum that operations proceed on the "cautious banker's" principle of no advance and security. Penetration and breakout was never accomplished because of this philosophy.Uniquerman (talk) 17:14, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

Correction: principle of no advance 'without' security.Uniquerman (talk) 17:16, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

There's a Whicker's War on YouTube where he talks about his experiences in Italy here: [1] - BTW, Alan Whicker took the pictures of Clark ascending some steps outside St Peter's that appeared in all the newspapers after he entered Rome. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 15:44, 14 January 2013 (UTC)

We need to include the perspective of someone who was on the ground. Norman Lewis, in Naples '44, has a blistering account of the conduct of the Salerno landings, with incompetence and panic running down from Clark to the units under his command. There was no proper organization and officers deserted their men. If it hadn't been for the long range fire of the warships, the German counter attack would have succeeded.

Train Guard — Preceding unsigned comment added by Train guard (talk • contribs) 20:19, 23 April 2016 (UTC)

From Operation Market Garden, The Legend of the Waal Crossing - Tim Lynch:

p.131-133.7 / 584:
The real issue was less about how the war should be won and increasingly about who would be seen to have won it. Nowhere was this attitude more clearly demonstrated than in Italy where, in May 1944, a multinational force under the overall command of British Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander was involved in heavy fighting. After the breakout from Anzio, Alexander’s plan was to send the American Fifth Army under Lieutenant General Mark ‘Wayne’ Clark north and east to cut off the escape route of Kesselring’s 10th and 14th Armies as the British Eighth Army pushed northwards. Clark, however, had other ideas. Determined to be the first General to capture an enemy capital, Clark told Alexander that if men of the Eighth Army approached Rome before his men could, he would order his Fifth Army troops (of whom only around a third were American, the remainder British, Polish, French and Commonwealth units) to fire on them - a threat Alexander chose not to hear because of the need for US support. As a result, "Clark’s calculated act was to prove as militarily stupid as it was insubordinate. He deliberately committed what must rank as one of the most misguided blunders made by any Allied Commander during World War II. About to win a stunning victory that would not only have given him the flattering prize of Rome virtually without a fight, but would have earned him immortality as a great battlefield Commander, Mark Clark suddenly dismembered [Alexander’s plan]."

p.133 / 584:
Clark would only allow himself to be photographed from what he considered his best side and travelled with his own 50-strong publicity staff who, amongst other things, created a special Fifth Army song that began ‘Stand up, stand up for General Clark, let’s sing the praises of General Clark …’
...

Interesting. Steinbeck, in the Preface to his ‘Once There Was A War’ describes this situation, but doesn’t name the General. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 220.240.82.127 (talk) 05:20, 5 March 2023 (UTC)

Clark had graduated from West Point 109th of his class of 135 in 1917. His pre-war friendship with Eisenhower served him well and at 46 he had became the youngest Lieutenant General in US history. He was to receive the Distinguished Service Order for gallantry at Salerno, an action in which he retreated back aboard ship when the landings came under fire and ordered the Fifth Army to ‘prepare to evacuate the beach.’
...
In his determination to take credit for the capture of Rome, Clark had openly disobeyed orders and allowed the German troops to escape and reorganise and in doing so had lengthened the war in Italy at a cost of thousands of Allied lives. When he died in 1984, however, he was reported in a UPI press release of 20 April as having been a ‘four-star general, who led the Allied conquest of Italy’.

    ←   ZScarpia   12:13, 26 January 2017 (UTC)

Cousin of George C. Marshall

Nope. Marshall's mother was Laura Bradford Marshall. Refer George C. Marshall. Wallie (talk) 15:46, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

Korean war section

THis is mostly junk about a bizarre little incident and says absolutely nothing NOTHING about Clark's conduct of the ending of the war. It should be deleted, and something more detailed an appropriate put in its place.

Opening: 5th Sentence

The 5th sentence in the opening in this article seems incomplete to me:

• "One legacy of the "Clark task force", which he headed from 1953-55 to recommend on all Federal intelligence activities, is coining the term Intelligence Community."

Can somebody fix this to what it was they intended to say? 143.120.99.10 (talk) 21:52, 19 November 2014 (UTC)

The sentence is complete and says what it intends to say. I cant fix it, if you dont say what part of the sentence is unclear to you. I added a ref, although this is not needed in the lede.--Wuerzele (talk) 03:04, 13 December 2014 (UTC)

Notice -- post on reliability of ww2today

Please review and respond here:

Wikipedia:Reliable_sources/Noticeboard#RS_for_WWII_--_ww2today.com_.3F

--David Tornheim (talk) 17:23, 6 May 2017 (UTC)

Clark... criticized for ignoring the orders of ... Alexander, allowing the German 10th Army to slip away, in his drive to take Rome...

1) The footnote supporting this title is a dead link. 2) In the article Battle_of_Monte_Cassino, in the section [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Monte_Cassino#Clark_captures_Rome_but_fails_to_trap_German_Tenth_Army ], contains the following passage regarding "Lieutenant General Clark, commanding the American Fifth Army": "However, General Alexander, C-in-C of the AAI, had clearly laid down the Army boundaries before the battle and Rome was allocated to the Fifth Army." 3) I am just a neophyte to WWII history, but unless I am mistaken, a superficial reading of my point (2) would indicate Clark was following Alexander's orders. 4) So why does the third paragraph of Mark Clark's article state the opposite (see below), that Clark ignored Alexanders orders? "Clark has been heavily criticized for ignoring the orders of his superior officer, British General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, and allowing the German 10th Army to slip away, in his drive to take Rome, the capital of Italy, a strategically unimportant city." SalineBrain (talk) 04:15, 29 September 2019 (UTC)

he caused deaths of GIs by his inaction/stupidty and this is not discussed? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.174.191.14 (talk) 16:54, 12 July 2020 (UTC)

External links

The "External links" section is bloated and needs trimming. Some content may be able to be integrated into the article but 10 links is not necessary. -- Otr500 (talk) 07:25, 12 July 2020 (UTC)

Dates of Rank Correction

Regarding the table, I am wondering if it is missing additional promotions for the Regular Army. Clark served as Commanding General, US Forces Austria and as Commander in Chief of United Nations Command (both requiring a promotion to four star I believe) after post-war demobilization in 1946. From what I understand reviewing the Army of the United States page, Clark should have reverted back to his last Regular Army rank of Brigadier General and then been promoted from within the Regular Army to assume those roles. Correct me if I am wrong; I don't have the greatest grasp on how AUS ranks worked after the war. FrostyMuppets (talk) 13:15, 24 January 2022 (UTC)

I am also curious how Clark was demoted on September 14, 1943? It says he went from a 3 star general to a 1 star general, and then from there to a 4 star general? Singdeep (talk) 05:11, 8 March 2022 (UTC)

The Army of the United States was a separate component of the Army, so officers generally had two separate ranks - their normal rank and their wartime rank. Clark was not demoted; had the United States not been at war, he would have been a Brigadier General (one star), but he was promoted from Lieutenant General to General concurrently in the AUS component. The table can be confusing because it isn't showing a linear path; there are promotions going on from two separate areas of the Army. His four stars should have gone away after the end of the war and then he should have been promoted again in the Regular Army to assume the roles he took post-war. I don't think the table reflects that. FrostyMuppets (talk) 10:57, 10 March 2022 (UTC)